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Burk: Constitutional Law--Federal Taxation of State Liquor Monopoly
REGENT CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW MONOPOLY. - The State of

FEDERAL TAXATioN OF STATE LIQUOR

Ohio moved to file a bill of complaint,

invoking the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the
United States to enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue

from levying and collecting excise taxes' on the state wholesale
and retail liquor distributors. 2 The complainant claimed that, as
a proper exercise of the police power, these state agencies were
"governmental functions" and therefore immune from Federal
taxation. Held, motion denied. The sale of liquor is a private
business and not a "governmental function"; the "police power"
as applied to business is the power to regulate it and not engage
3
in it. State of Ohio v. Helvering.
As a necessary consequence of our complex system of government, though not expressly provided for, the means and instru-

mentalities of the state and federal governments are not taxable
by the other. 4 Just what instrumentalities are immune may not be
stated in terms of universal application' but usually the means and
property necessitated for police regulation have enjoyed this immunity.' Thus, it seems that the liquor monopoly, admittedly a
proper exercise of the police power,7 should be a non-taxable governmental function."
Nevertheless, in South Carolina v. United States,9 this activity
120 STAT. 333, 342 (1897), 26 U. S. C. A. § 205, (a), (b) (1926).
2 OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, Supp. 1933) § 6064-1 et seg. 6064-8-1: "To con-

trol the traffic in beer and intoxicating liquor in the state, including the
manufacture, importation, and sale thereof as in the act provided."
60648-3, "To put into operation, manage and control a system of state liquor
stores for the sale of spiritous liquor ....

; and thereby and by means of

such manufacturing plants .... and other facilities as it may deem expedient
in connection therewith, to establish and maintain a state monopoly .. .
3 54 S. Ct. 725 (1934).
4 M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. ed. 579 (1819); The Collector
v. Day, 11 Wall. 113, 20 L. ed. 122 (1870).
5 Metcalf and Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, 523, 46 S. Ct. 172, 174
(1926). The rule, though understandable enough as a general idea, has, in
its application, caused the Supreme Court much embarrassment.
6 Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 570, 51 S. Ct. 601
(1932).
7No principle is more universally recognized than the power of a state to
control the liquor traffic. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 8 S. Ct. 273
(1887); Plumb v. Christie, 103 Ga. 686, 30 S. E. 759 (1898). "A state law
prohibiting the sale of liquors by others, though, by authorizing and providing for the establishment of dispensaries for their sale by agents of the
state, it recognizes such liquors as the subject of legitimate commerce, is a
regulation of the sale which is a proper exercise of the police powers of the
state." Vance v. W. A. Vandercook Co., 170 U. S. 438, 18 S. Ct. 674 (1898),

syl. 2.

8 See Mr. Justice White's dissenting opinion in South Carolina v, United
StstPs. 199 U. S. 437, 26 S. Ct. 110 (1905).
9 Supra n. 8,
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was held to be taxable by the Federal government. 10 The court,
employing legal arguments as make-weights," relied chiefly upon
the economic argument that a recognition of immunity in the
liquor dispensaries would probably cause states to enter into all
businesses over which they have control, 12 thereby greatly decreasing the revenue of the United States. This argument seems unsound on its merits, for the diminution in Federal income is a coincidence which would be no greater than that of the states resulting from such projects as Mussel Shoals or the T. V. A." But
the fact that the state can prohibit the liquor traffic and in so
doing entirely deprive the Federal government of these taxes, 4
renders the argument inapplicable here.
The principal case accepts the South Carolina case as authority
but ignores its basic rationale. It baldly assumes that this method
of control is a private business' in which the state may engage but
one which cannot be supported by the police power.16 Such a con10 The state liquor dispensaries were created under an act quite similar to
that of Ohio, S. C. CRan. CODE (1912) § 843 et seq., and the tax was the same
as imposed in the instant case.
11 The court asserts that the tax is not upon the property but upon the
means by which it is acquired. The distinction disregards the regulatory or
police aspects of the monopoly for it is a means of control and not one of
deriving profit. Ajax v. Gregory, 32 Pac. (2d) 560 (Wash. 1934). The immunity applies as well to excise as to property taxes. The court relied on the
somewhat discredited distinction between governmental and private functions
developed in municipal tort cases. Even if applicable the analogy would
support tax immunity since in police activities the city is usually immune
from tort liability. Roumbos v. Chicago, 332 Ill. 70, 163 N. E. 361 (1928).
Likewise, city utility services are immune from taxation by the Federal government. Woodworth v. Frey, 2 F. (2d) 725 (D. C. Mich. 1924), writ of
error denied 270 U. S. 669, 46 S. Ct. 347 (1925) (city operated street railway although the activity was not mandatory and passengers were required
to pay fares).
12 This situation would hardly arise for the exigencies accompanying the
traffic in other commodities are not so great as in the liquor traffic. BLACK,
INTOXICATING LIQUORS, § 35.
13 In fact the Federal projects named infringe more heavily upon private
business for there is no inherent right to engage in the liquor business.
Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86, 91, 11 S. Ct. 13, 15 (1890).
'4 Silberglied v. Mulrooney, 270 N. Y. Supp. 290, 150 Misc. 251 (1934).
1 Undoubtedly the large profit to be derived was a compelling factor in
this decision but this factor alone should not be sufficient to change the governmental character into a private one. Equitable Loan and Security Co.
v. Edwardsville, 143 Ala. 182, 38 So. 1016 (1905); United States v. King
County, Wash., 281 Fed. 686 (C. C. A. 9th, 1922); Woodworth v. Frey,
upra n. 11.

16 Both this case and the South Carolina case rely upon Rippe v. Becker, 56
Minn. 100, 57 N. W. 331 (1894), for the proposition that police power is
power to regulate business and not to engage in it. In that case the state
was denied the power of entering into the grain elevator business. But the
asserted power to enter an otherwise inoffensive business to overcome price
evils is quite remote from the power to enter a business dangerous both to
public safety and morals.
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elusion is a flat, rejection of their former decision recognizing the
liquor monopoly as a valid exercise of the police power.' 7
In
other words, the court has considered the monopoly as a governmental function for the purpose of constitutionality but as a private
function for the purpose of taxation.
This result is probably desirable for the tax imposed does not
seriously burden or affect the efficient discharge of the duty to
protect.' But, it would be more consistent to recognize the liquor
monopoly as a governmental function for all purposes and to modify the doctrine of reciprocal immunity so that its applicability"0
would be limited to those cases where the imposition of the tax
20
would be a substantial impediment.
-ROBERT
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This was a taxpayers'
suit to enjoin a bond issue to subsidize improvements to a municipal water works on the ground that it would be a debt exceeding
the constitutional debt limit.' The city was acting under a recent
statute which provides, "bonds issued under the provisions of this
act shall be payable solely from revenues derived from such waterworks systems and such bonds shall not in any event constitute an
ISSUE PAYABLE FROM UTIIATY INCOME. -

1TUnder the usual constitutional prohibition of states engaging in business, there is no other authority for the activity than the police power. State
v. City Council of Aiken, 42 S. C. 222, 20 S. E. 221 (1894).
18 The rationale of the doctrine is that in a federal system one government
should not be permitted to impair or cripple the instrumentalities by which the
other discharges its public duties. The Collector v. Day, supra n. 4. The
tax imposed in the principal case would not be such -an impairment.
19 "Its application does not depend upon the amount of the exaction, the
weight of the burden, or the extent of the resulting interference with sovereign
independence. Where it applies, the principle is an absolute one wholly unaffected by matters or distinctions of degree." Trinity Farm Construction Co.
v. Grosjean, 54 S. Ct. 469, 470 (1934).
20 A somewhat similar view is expressed in Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U. S. 216,
225, 51 S. Ct. 125, 127 (1931). The implied exemption of the instrumentalities of state government from Federal taxation does not extend to cases
"where no direct burden is laid upon the governmental instrumentality, and
there is only a remote, if any, influence upon the exercise of the functions of
the government."
1 Other grounds stated in the case, that the ordinance does not conform
to the requirements of the act, and that the act was not in the scope of the
executive proclamation convening the legislature in extraordinary session,
were settled in Brewer v. City of Point Pleasant, 172 S, E. 717 (W. Va.
1934).
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